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Abstract
In Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems, key revocation is non-trivial. This is because a user’s identity is
itself a public key. Moreover, the private key corresponding to the identity needs to be obtained from a trusted key
authority through an authenticated and secrecy protected channel. So far, there exist only a very small number of
revocable IBE (RIBE) schemes that support non-interactive key revocation, in the sense that the user is not required to
interact with the key authority or some kind of trusted hardware to renew her private key without changing her public
key (or identity). These schemes are either proven to be only selectively secure or have public parameters which
grow linearly in a given security parameter. In this paper, we present two constructions of non-interactive RIBE that
satisfy all the following three attractive properties: (i) proven to be adaptively secure under the Symmetric External
Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) and the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions; (ii) have constant-size public parameters;
and (iii) preserve the anonymity of ciphertexts—a property that has not yet been achieved in all the current schemes.
Index Terms
Dual System Encryption, Functional Encryption, Identity-Based Encryption, Key Revocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-based encryption (IBE) allows one’s identity to be directly used as a public key [29, 6, 12]. This obviates
the need for a public key certificate that attests the binding between the identity and a (seemingly) random key, as
in the case of more conventional certificate-based public-key systems. Thus, IBE systems have simpler public key
management than that of certificate-based systems. In IBE, however, a private key (corresponding to an identity)
needs to be generated by a trusted key authority. This and the fact that a user’s identity is itself a public key
complicates key renewal or revocation—one cannot simply change her public key, as this changes her identity as
well. While there has been a great deal of work on IBE in recent years, see for example [7, 30, 8, 13, 31, 10, 1, 2],
not much work has been devoted to key revocation.
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2One direct way to alleviate the key revocation problem in the IBE setting is to maintain a revocation list by some
trusted third party. A sender checks on the trusted third party and just stops to encrypt messages if the corresponding
receiver is revoked. However, this direct model requires the trusted third party to keep online in order to respond
any sender’s real time checking query. To address this problem, one simple solution is to append a validity period
to a target identity during encryption [6]. This results in a public key with a limited validity period, and hence,
restricting the window of exposure should the corresponding private key is compromised. If the validity period is
sufficiently short, one may not require an explicit key revocation mechanism since an exposed private key is of
little value to an adversary beyond the specified validity period. However, one major drawback of this approach is
that each user has to periodically renew her private key. As a consequence, the key authority’s workload increases
linearly in the number of non-revoked users. Further, we must ensure that each transmission of a new private key
between the key authority and a non-revoked user is performed through some form of authenticated and secure
channel. There exist some improved key revocation techniques in the literature, for example [19, 15]. However,
they require interactions either between the user and the key authority, as before, or between the user and some
kind of trusted hardware. These may not always be practical.
The first non-interactive, revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme that neither presupposes the existence of trusted hardware
nor requires a secure channel between the user and the key authority, is due to Boldyreva et al. [5]. Their scheme
borrows the concept of fuzzy IBE (FIBE) [28] in which encryption of a message is associated with two “attributes”,
namely identity of the receiver and time period. The corresponding decryption key is also split into two private
components, matching the identity and the time period, respectively. The private component that corresponds to the
identity is essentially similar to a regular private key in IBE and it is issued to a user by the key authority through
a secure channel. On the other hand, the private key component corresponding to the time period is regarded as a
key update and is published by the key authority to all users. (Here the key update is public information and does
not require secrecy protection.) Thus, to revoke a user, the key authority simply stops distributing the key update
for that user. To reduce the number of key updates to be performed by the key authority, Boldyreva et al. organize
and relate users’ key updates in a binary tree [3, 22]. Briefly speaking, each node of the tree is assigned some
key material and each user is assigned to a leaf node in the tree. Upon registration, the key authority computes
and provides the user with a set of distinct private keys (corresponding to its identity) based on the key material
for each node in the path from the leaf node corresponding to that user to the root node. To be able to decrypt
a ciphertext associated with time t, the user needs just one key update (corresponding to t) computed on the key
material associated to any of the nodes on the path from the leaf node of the user to the root node. Thus, when no
user is revoked, the key authority publishes just the key update computed on the key material of the root node. When
a subset of the users is revoked, the key authority first finds the minimal set of nodes in the tree which contains
an ancestor (or, the node itself) among all the leaf nodes corresponding to non-revoked users. The key authority
then distributes the key updates for only this set. This way, every update of the revocation list only requires the key
authority to perform logarithmic work in the maximal number of users and linear in the number of revoked users.
3A. Previous Non-Interactive RIBE Constructions
Although an adaptive-ID secure IBE scheme [30] (which is resilient even against an adversary that is allowed
to adaptively select an identity as the attack target based on the responses to the adversary’s queries in a security
game) has been in existence for some years, constructing an RIBE scheme with equivalent security guarantee is
non-trivial. This is evident from the first RIBE scheme proposed by Boldyreva et al. [5]. Although it is intriguing
that their RIBE scheme was constructed from the FIBE scheme of [28] and made clever use of the binary tree
technique, the scheme was only proven in the selective-ID model, which is, unfortunately, a rather weak model.
This is because the adversary is required to set the challenge identity and time at the beginning of a security game
before receiving the relevant public parameters. Nevertheless, Libert and Vergnaud [21] eventually proposed an
adaptive-ID secure RIBE scheme using similar key revocation techniques as with [5], and thus solved the problem
left open by Boldyreva et al. However, instead of building on FIBE, Libert and Vergnaud adopted a variant [20]
of the Waters IBE scheme [30], which is based on partitioning techniques and has a drawback in having public
parameters that comprise O(λ) group elements for security parameter λ. Consequently, the Libert and Vergnaud
RIBE scheme inherits a similar limitation. Clearly, it is desirable that a scheme has small or constant-size public
parameters, secret keys, and ciphertexts, if it were to be deployed in real world applications.
B. RIBE from Dual System Encryption
Moving beyond proving security through the partitioning techniques, Waters proposed the dual system encryption
methodology [31], which has been a powerful tool to obtain full security for various classes of functional encryption
(FE) [9], such as IBE [31, 17, 16], inner product encryption (IPE) [18], and attribute-based encryption (ABE) [18,
25]. Although there already exist some schemes that achieve full security using the dual system encryption technique,
(for example, the HIBE scheme of [17] has been proven to be fully secure by applying this technique to the
HIBE scheme of [7]), however, these fully secure schemes typically require relatively large parameters and/or
constructed only in the composite order bilinear groups. Thus, in general, the dual system encryption methodology
does not always provide generic transformation from selective security to adaptive security without suffering from
the mentioned limitations.
In our work, we initially tried to apply the dual system encryption technique to the selective-ID RIBE scheme
of [5], however this results an analogous construction and proof to the ABE scheme of [25]. Furthermore, as we
illustrate below, such an approach does not enjoy constant-size public parameters and keys.
To see this, we specifically consider the binary-tree key update approach [5, 21] in the setting similar to key-policy
ABE.1 As before, a ciphertext in the RIBE scheme is associated with two attributes: identity idi and time period
tj . The ciphertext can be decrypted by a user if and only if the user possesses both the private key for identity
idi and the key update for time tj on some node in the tree. Since the private keys and key updates associated
with a specific node are not given to the users simultaneously, collusion among some (non-revoked) users on some
1The case for ciphertext-policy ABE setting is similar.
4attributes (i.e. time attribute) is possible. Hence from the view of ABE, all users can be regarded as “sharing” the
same key (or private component) associated with access structure of the form
(id1 ∨ · · · ∨ idn) ∧ (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm)
on each node in the tree for some integers n and m, but each user is given only some parts of the key for this
access structure. That is, the parts of the key that the user gets correspond to access structure idi∧ (t1 ∨· · ·∨ tm) if
this node is in the path from the leaf node associated with idi to the root node; while the key updates corresponding
to (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm) are given to all users (not necessarily at the same time). Clearly, we require that the private keys
are collusion-resistant on different nodes. Moreover, supporting a large universe attribute space is required and can
be used to deal with exponential identity spaces in RIBE.
We observe that, however, the adaptively secure ABE schemes of [25] cannot be used directly for our purpose
because the resulting RIBE somewhat unexpectedly has private keys and ciphertexts with sizes that grow linearly in
the maximal number of users and the size of time space (even though they are polynomial in the security parameter).
It turns out that constructing a fully secure RIBE scheme with constant-size public parameters and keys requires
additional work.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we investigate how to instantiate the Waters dual system encryption methodology with revocable IBE
schemes. Particularly, we construct two efficient non-interactive RIBE schemes that are proven to be adaptively
secure under the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) and the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions,
respectively.
Our schemes improve the previous work by achieving adaptive security with constant-size public parameters.
Moreover, our schemes are anonymous, namely, preserving the privacy of ciphertext recipients and encryption times.
We note that previous RIBE schemes do not consider the anonymity property, an advantage inherited from using
the dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [23, 24] to achieve orthogonality and entropy-hiding in prime-order groups.
Our constructions also make use of the key revocation techniques of [5, 21], namely, we employ binary-tree data
structure to achieve key update with logarithmic complexity in the maximal number of users for the key authority.
We give a summary of comparisons between existing and our RIBE schemes in Table I. Here, we use PP to
denote public parameters, MK to denote master key, SK to denote private key, KU to denote key update, CT to
denote ciphertext, and # pairing to denote the number of pairing computation for decryption. The sizes are in terms
of group elements and λ denotes the security parameter.
5TABLE I
COMPARISONS BETWEEN EXISTING AND OUR RIBE SCHEMES.
BGK [5] LV [21] Ours
size of PP 5 O(λ) 19 55
size of MK 1 1 19 55
size of SK 2 3 6 9
size of KU 2 3 6 9
size of CT 4 5 6 9
# pairings 4 3 12 18
security selective adaptive adaptive adaptive
anonymity No No Yes Yes
assumption DBDH mDBDH SXDH DLIN
We compare our schemes against Boldyreva et al.’s scheme [5], which is under the Decision Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) assumption, and Libert and Vergnaud’s scheme [21], which is under the modified DBDH
(mDBDH) assumption. Overall, our schemes are anonymous, adaptively secure, and have constant-size public
parameters, at the expense of bigger (but still seems acceptable) sizes in terms of the master key, private key, and
key update.
D. Our Approach
In RIBE, different from the standard security game for IBE, the adversary is allowed to query parts of the
challenge identities and time periods. Thus, to overcome the problem of increasing sizes of public parameters in the
maximal number of users and sizes of the time space as analyzed in the ABE setting, our security proof makes use
of two types of nominally semi-functional pairs, while all the previous works based on the dual system encryption
methodology, such as [17, 16, 18, 25], require only a single type of nominally semi-functional pair. Moreover,
prior to the start of the game, we execute a preliminary game to “locate” the positions of the challenge identities
and times. We then transform all the private keys and key updates associated with the non-challenge identities and
times, respectively, into nominally semi-functional (we denote by Type I) one by one. We transform the challenge
private keys and key updates (or simply keys) into nominally semi-functional (we denote by Type II) node by node
at the last step. Note that the distribution of nominally semi-functional pairs of Type I for challenge identities and
times can be detected by the adversary that they are different from the distribution of the semi-functional keys and
ciphertexts. Moreover, nominally semi-functional pairs of Type II can be only generated for the last remaining keys;
in other words, all the other keys must have been already semi-functional. This is why the preliminary game is
needed. We also introduce some statistical indistinguishability arguments in our proof to show that the distributions
of nominally semi-functional pair of both Types I & II remain the same as the distributions of semi-functional
keys and ciphertexts from the adversary’s view. Finally, we arrive at a security game that only requires to generate
semi-functional keys and ciphertexts while security can be proved directly.
6II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
Our constructions are based on dual pairing vector spaces proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [23, 24]. In this
paper, we concentrate on the asymmetric version [26]. Particularly, we give a brief description on how to generate
random dual orthonormal bases. See [23, 24] for a full definition of dual pairing vector spaces.
Definition 1 (Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups). Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups (q,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e)
are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic (multiplicative) groups G1, G2 and GT of order q, g1 6= 1 ∈ G1, g2 6= 1 ∈ G2,
and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT i.e., e(gs1, gt2) = e(g1, g2)st
and e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
In addition to individual elements of G1 or G2, we will also consider “vectors” of group elements. For v =
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Znq and gβ ∈ Gβ , we write gvβ to denote a n-tuple of elements of Gβ for β = 1, 2:
gvβ := (g
v1
β , . . . , g
vn
β ).
For any a ∈ Zq and v,w ∈ Znq , we have:
gavβ := (g
av1
β , . . . , g
avn
β ), g
v+w
β := (g
v1+w1
β , . . . , g
vn+wn
β ).
Then we define
e(gv1 , g
w
2 ) :=
n∏
i=1
e(gvi1 , g
wi
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
v·w.
Here, the dot product is taken modulo q.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we choose two random bases B := (b1, . . . ,bn)
and B∗ := (b∗1, . . . ,b∗n) of Znq , subject to the constraint that they are “dual orthonormal”, meaning that
bi · b
∗
j = 0 (mod q)
whenever i 6= j, and
bi · b
∗
i = ψ (mod q)
for all i, where ψ is a random element of Zq . We denote the above algorithm, which generates the dual orthonormal
bases, as Dual(·). Then for generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, we have
e(gbi1 , g
b
∗
j
2 ) = 1
whenever i 6= j, where 1 here denotes the identity element in GT .
B. Complexity Assumptions
To define the SXDH assumption, we first define DDH problems in G1 and G2.
7Definition 2 (DDH1: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G1). Given a group generator G, we define the
following distribution:
G := (q,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e)←R G,
a, b, c←R Zq ,
D := (G; g1, g2, g
a
1 , g
b
1).
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
Adv
DDH1
A (λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(D, gab1 )− Pr[A(D, gab+c1 )]∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
The dual of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G1 is Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G2 (denoted
as DDH2), which is identical to Definitions 2 with the roles of G1 and G2 reversed. We say that:
Definition 3. The Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if DDH problems are intractable in both
G1 and G2.
The following SXDH-based Subspace assumptions is from [11], which we will use in our security proof.
Definition 4 (DS1: Decisional Subspace Assumption in G1). Given a group generator G(·), define the following
distribution:
G := (q,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e)←R G(1
λ),
(B,B∗)←R Dual(ZNq ),
τ1, τ2, µ1, µ2 ←R Zq,
U1 := g
µ1b
∗
1+µ2b
∗
K+1
2 , . . . , UK := g
µ1b
∗
K+µ2b
∗
2K
2 ,
V1 := g
τ1b1
1 , . . . , VK := g
τ1bK
1 ,
W1 := g
τ1b1+τ2bK+1
1 , . . . ,WK := g
τ1bK+τ2b2K
1 ,
D := (G; g
b
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
K
2 , g
b
∗
2K+1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
N
2 ,
gb11 , . . . , g
bN
1 , U1, . . . , UK , µ2),
where K,N are fixed positive integers that satisfy 2K ≤ N . We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output
in {0, 1}),
Adv
DS1
A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,V1, . . . , VK) = 1]− Pr[A(D,W1, . . . ,WK) = 1]|
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
8Lemma 1. If the DDH assumption in G1 holds, then the Subspace assumption in G1 stated in Definition 4 also holds.
More precisely, for any adversary A against the Subspace assumption in G1, there exist probabilistic algorithms
B whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that
Adv
DS1
A (λ) ≤ Adv
DDH1
B (λ).
The dual of the Subspace assumption in G1 is Subspace assumption in G2 (denoted as DS2), which is identical to
Definitions 4 with the roles of G1 and G2 reversed. Similarly, the Subspace assumption holds in G2 if the DDH
assumption in G2 holds.
We define the DLIN problem in symmetric bilinear pairing groups (namely G1 = G2). The DLIN-based Subspace
assumptions could be found in [16, 25].
Definition 5 (DLIN: Decisional Linear Assumption). Given a group generator G, we define the following distri-
bution:
G := (q,G,GT , g, e)←R G,
a1, a2, b1, b2, c←R Zq,
D := (G; g, ga1, ga2 , ga1b1 , ga2b2).
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
Adv
DLIN
A (λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr[A(D, gb1+b2)− Pr[A(D, gb1+b2+c1 )]
∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
III. REVOCABLE IBE
We first recall the definition of RIBE and its security from [5] and then define an appropriate security model for
our constructions.
Definition 6. An Identity-Based Encryption with efficient revocation or simply Revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme has
seven PPT algorithms Setup, PriKeyGen, KeyUpd, DecKeyGen, Enc, Dec, and KeyRev with associated message
space M, identity space I and time space T . We assume that the size of T is polynomial in the security parameter.
Each algorithm is run by either one of three types of parties—key authority, sender or receiver. Key authority
maintains a revocation list RL and state ST. In what follows, an algorithm is called stateful if it updates RL or
ST. We treat time as discrete as opposed to continuous.
• Setup(1λ, Nmax) takes as input a security parameter λ and a maximal number of users Nmax. It outputs
public parameters PP, a master key MK, a revocation list RL (initially empty), and a state ST. (This is run
by the key authority.)
• PriKeyGen(PP,MK, id, ST) takes as input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, an identity id ∈ I,
and the state ST. It outputs a private key SKid and an updated state ST. (This is stateful and run by the key
authority.)
9• KeyUpd(PP,MK, t,RL, ST) takes as input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, a key update time
t ∈ T , the revocation list RL, and the state ST. It outputs a key update KUt. (This is run by the key authority.)
• DecKeyGen(SKid,KUt) takes as input a private key SKid and key update KUt. It outputs a decryption key
DKid,t or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that id was revoked. (This is deterministic and run by the receiver.)
• Enc(PP, id, t,m) takes as input the public parameters PP, an identity id ∈ I, an encryption time t ∈ T , and
a message m ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext CTid,t. (This is run by the sender.)
• Dec(PP,DKid,t,CTid,t) takes as input the public parameters PP, a decryption key DKid,t, and a ciphertext
CTid,t. It outputs a message m ∈ M. (This is deterministic and run by the receiver.)
• KeyRev(id, t,RL, ST) takes as input an identity to be revoked id ∈ I, a revocation time t ∈ T , the revocation
list RL, and the state ST. It outputs an updated revocation list RL. (This is stateful and run by the key authority.)
The consistency condition requires that for all λ ∈ N and polynomials (in λ) Nmax, all PP and MK output by setup
algorithm Setup, all m ∈ M, id ∈ I, t ∈ T and all possible valid states ST and revocation lists RL, if identity id
was not revoked before or, at time t then the following experiment returns 1 except for a negligible probability:
(SKid, ST)←R PriKeyGen(PP,MK, id, ST);
KUt ←R KeyUpd(PP,MK, t,RL, ST)
DKid,t ← DecKeyGen(SKid,KUt);
CTid,t ←R Enc(PP, id, t,m)
If Dec(PP,DKid,t,CTid,t) = m then return 1 else return 0.
Boldyreva et al. formalized and defined the selective-ID security for RIBE. Their definition captures not only the
standard notion of selective-ID security but also takes into account key revocation. The following definition extends
the security property expressed in [5] to the adaptive-ID and anonymous setting.
• Setup: It is run to generate public parameters PP, a master key MK, a revocation list RL (initially empty),
and a state ST. Then PP is given to A.
• Query: A may adaptively make a polynomial number of queries of the following oracles (the oracles share
state):
– The private key generation oracle PriKeyGen(·) takes as input an identity id and runs PriKeyGen(PP,MK, id, ST)
to return a private key SKid.
– The key update generation oracle KeyUpd(·) takes as input time t and runs KeyUpd(PP,MK, t,RL, ST)
to return a key update KUt.
– The revocation oracle KeyRev(·, ·) takes as input an identity id and time t and runs KeyRev(id, t,RL, ST)
to update RL.
• Challenge: A outputs the two challenge pair (id∗(0), t∗(0),m∗(0)), (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)) ∈ I × T ×M. A random
bit β is chosen. A is given Enc(PP, id∗(β), t∗(β),m∗(β)).
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• Guess: The adversary may continue to make queries of the oracles as in Query phase and outputs a bit β′,
and succeeds if β′ = β.
The following restrictions must always hold:
1) KeyUpd(·) and KeyRev(·, ·) can be queried on time which is greater than or equal to the time of all
previous queries, i.e., the adversary is allowed to query only in non-decreasing order of time. Also, the
oracle KeyRev(·, ·) cannot be queried at time t if KeyUpd(·) was queried on t.
2) For β = 0, 1, if PriKeyGen(·) was queried on identity id(β) then KeyRev(·, ·) must be queried on (id∗(β), t)
for some t ≤ t∗(β), i.e., identity id
∗
(β) must be in RL when KeyUpd(·) is queried at time t∗(β).
For β = 0, 1 let Wβ be the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Experiment β and define
Adv
RIBE
A (λ) := |Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]|.
Definition 7. An RIBE scheme is adaptive-ID secure and anonymous if for all PPT adversaries A the function
Adv
RIBE
A (λ) is negligible.
Remark: The security notion of non-anonymous RIBE is defined as above with restriction that id∗(0) = id
∗
(1) and
t∗(0) = t
∗
(1). On the other hand, if the adversary A outputs (id
∗
(0), id
∗
(0)) and (id∗(1), t∗(1)) before the Setup phase, it
is selective-ID security.
IV. CONSTRUCTION FROM SXDH
In this section, we present our first construction of RIBE and its proof of security under the SXDH assumption.
A. The Binary-tree Data Structure
Key revocation in our scheme relies on binary-tree data structure, as with [3, 22, 5, 21]. We denote the binary-tree
by BT and its root node by root. If ν is a leaf node then Path(ν) denotes the set of nodes on the path from ν to
root (both ν and root inclusive). If θ is a non-leaf node then θℓ, θr denote the left and right child of θ, respectively.
We assume that all nodes in the tree are uniquely encoded as strings, and the tree is defined by all of its node
descriptions.
Each user is assigned to a leaf node ν. Upon registration, the key authority provides the user with a set of distinct
private keys for each node in Path(ν). At time t, the key authority uses an algorithm called KUNodes to determine
the minimal set Y of nodes in BT such that none of the nodes in RL with corresponding time ≤ t (users revoked on
or before t) have any ancestor (or, themselves) in the set Y, and all other leaf nodes (corresponding to non-revoked
users) have exactly one ancestor (or, themselves) in the set. The KUNodes algorithm takes as input a binary tree
11
BT, a revocation list RL and a time t, and can be formally specified as follows:
KUNodes(BT,RL, t)
X,Y ← ∅
∀(νi, ti) ∈ RL
if ti ≤ t then add Path(νi) to X
∀θ ∈ X
if θℓ 6∈ X then add θℓ to Y
if θr 6∈ X then add θr to Y
If Y = ∅ then add root to Y
Return Y
The KUNodes algorithm marks all the ancestors of revoked nodes as revoked and outputs all the non-revoked
children of revoked nodes. The key authority then publishes a key update for all nodes of Y. A user assigned to leaf
ν is then able to form an effective decryption key for time t if the set Y contains a node in Path(ν). By doing so,
every update of the revocation list RL only requires the key authority to perform logarithmic work in the maximal
number of users and linear in the number of revoked users.
B. Our Scheme
We now specify our RIBE scheme. We sometimes provide some intuition or remark at the end of an algorithm
and this is marked by the symbol “//”.
• Setup(λ,Nmax) On input a security parameter λ, and a maximal number Nmax of users, and generate a
bilinear pairing G := (q,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e) for sufficiently large prime order q. Next perform the following
steps:
1) Let RL be an empty set and BT be a binary-tree with at least Nmax leaf nodes, set ST = BT.
2) Sample random dual orthonormal bases, (D,D∗) ←R Dual(Z6q). Let d1, . . . ,d6 denote the elements of
D and d∗1, . . . ,d∗6 denote the elements of D∗. It also picks α←R Zq and computes gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
3) Output RL, ST, the public parameters
PP :=
{
G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1
}
,
and the master key MK
MK :=
{
α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2
}
.
• PriKeyGen(PP,MK, id,RL, ST) On input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, an identity id, the
revocation list RL, and the state ST, it picks an unassigned leaf node v from BT and stores id in that node.
It then performs the following steps:
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1) For any θ ∈ Path(v), if αθ,1, αθ,2 are undefined, then pick αθ,1 ←R Zq , set αθ,2 = α − αθ,1, and store
them in node θ2. Pick rθ,1 ←R Zq and compute
Kid,θ := g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2
2 .
2) Output SKid := {(θ,Kid,θ)}θ∈Path(v), ST.
//The algorithm computes the id-component of the decryption key for all the nodes on the path from the leaf
node (corresponding to id) to root.
• KeyUpd(PP,MK, t,RL, ST) On input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, a time t, the revocation
list RL, and the state ST, it performs the following steps:
1) ∀θ ∈ KUNodes(BT,RL, t), if αθ,1, αθ,2 are undefined, then pick αθ,1 ←R Zq , set αθ,2 = α− αθ,1, and
store them in node θ. Pick rθ,2 ←R Zq and compute
Kt,θ := g
(αθ,2+rθ,2t)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3
2 .
2) Output KUt := {(θ,Kt,θ)}θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,t).
//The algorithm first finds a minimal set of nodes which contains an ancestor (or, the node itself) of all the
non-revoked nodes. Then it computes the t-component of the decryption key for all the nodes in that set.
• DecKeyGen(SKid,KUt) On input a private secret key SKid := {(i,Kid,i)}i∈I, KUt := {(j,Kt,j)}j∈J for some
set of nodes I, J, it runs the following steps:
1) ∀(i,Kid,i) ∈ SKid, (j,Kt,j) ∈ KUt, if ∃(i, j) s.t. i = j then DKid,t ← (Kid,i,Kt,j); else (if SKid and KUt
do not have any node in common) DKid,t ← ⊥.
2) Output DKid,t.
• Enc(PP, id, t,m) On input the public parameters PP, an identity id, a time t ∈ Znq , and a message m, pick
z ←R Zq and forms the ciphertext as
CTid,t :=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z, C0 := g
z(d1+idd2+td3)
1
}
.
• Dec(PP,DKid,t,CTid,t) On input the public parameters PP, a decryption key DKid,t := (Kid,θ,Kt,θ), and a
ciphertext CTid,t := (C,C0), it computes the message as
m := C/ (e(C0,Kid,θ) · e(C0,Kt,θ)) .
• KeyRev(id, t,RL, ST) On input an identity id, a time t, the revocation list RL, and the state ST, the algorithm
adds (id, t) to RL for all nodes ν associated with identity id and returns RL.
This ends the description of our scheme.
2To avoid having to store αθ,1, αθ,2 for each node, the authority can derive them from a pseudo-random function of using a shorter seed
and re-compute them when necessary.
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Correctness: Observe that
e(C0,Kid,θ)
= e(g
z(d1+idd2+td3)
1 , g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2
2 )
= e(g1, g2)
αθ,1zd1·d
∗
1 · e(g1, g2)
zrθ,1idd1·d
∗
1−zrθ,1idd2·d
∗
2
= e(g1, g2)
αθ,1zd1·d
∗
1 .
Similarly, e(C0,Kt,θ) = e(g1, g2)αθ,2zd1·d
∗
1
. The message is recovered as:
C/e(C0,Kid,θ) · e(C0,Kt,θ)
= m · (e(g1, g2)
αd1·d
∗
1 )z/e(g1, g2)
αzd1·d
∗
1
= m.
C. Proof of Security
Statistical Indistinguishability Lemmas: We require the following two lemmas, which are derived from [26], for
our security proofs.
Lemma 2. For p ∈ Zq , let
Cp :=
{
(x,v)|x · v = p,0 6= x,0 6= v ∈ Znq
}
.
For all (x,v) ∈ Cp, for all (z,w) ∈ Cp, and A←R Zn×nq (A is invertible with overwhelming probability),
Pr[xA⊤ = z ∧ vA−1 = w] =
1
#Cp
.
Lemma 3. For p1, p2 ∈ Zq , let
Cp1,p2 :=
{
(x,v1,v2)
∣∣∣ x 6= 0,x · v1 = p1,x · v2 = p2
}
where x,v1,v2 ∈ Znq , {v1,v2} are linearly independent over Zq . For all (x,v1,v2) ∈ Cp1,p2 , for all (z,w1,w2) ∈
Cp1,p2 , and A←R Zn×nq (A is invertible with overwhelming probability),
Pr[xA⊤ = z ∧ v1A
−1 = w1 ∧ v2A
−1 = w2] =
1
#Cp1,p2
.
The following theorem shows that our RIBE scheme is indeed adaptively secure and anonymous.
Theorem 1. The RIBE scheme is adaptively secure and anonymous under the SXDH assumption. More precisely,
for any adversary A against the RIBE scheme, there exist probabilistic algorithms
B0,
{Bκ1,κ2}κ1=1,...,qn1 ,κ2=1,...,⌈logNmax⌉,
{Bκ1,κ2}κ1=qn1+1,...,qn1+qn2+1,κ2=1,...,Nmax ,
{Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2}κ2=1,...,4Nmax
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whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that
Adv
RIBE
A (λ) ≤ (qn1qn2)
2 ·
(
Adv
DDH1
B0 (λ) +
qn1∑
κ1=1
⌈logNmax⌉∑
κ2=1
Adv
DDH2
Bκ1,κ2
(λ) +
qn2∑
κ1=qn1+1
Nmax∑
κ2=1
Adv
DDH2
Bκ1,κ2
(λ)
+
4Nmax∑
κ2=1
Adv
DDH2
Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2
(λ) +
6(qn1⌈logNmax⌉+ qn2Nmax) + 32Nmax + 6
q
)
where qn1 , qn2 ≥ 4 are the maximum number of A’s private key and key update queries respectively.
Proof: We adopt the dual system encryption methodology by Waters [31] to prove the security of our RIBE
scheme. We use the concepts of semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys in our proof and provide
algorithms that generate them. Particularly, we define two types of semi-functional keys: semi-functional private
keys (for identity) and semi-functional key updates (for time). We note that the algorithms (we specify below) are
only provided for definitional purposes, and are not part of the RIBE system. In particular, they do not need to be
efficiently computable from the public parameters and the master key.
PriKeyGenSF The algorithm picks rθ,1, νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1 randomly from Zq and forms a semi-functional private
key for node θ as
K
(SF)
id,θ := g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+[νθ,4,1d
∗
4+νθ,5,1d
∗
5+γθ,6,1d
∗
6 ]
2 . (1)
KeyUpdSF The algorithm picks rθ,2, νθ,4,2, νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2 randomly from Zq and forms a semi-functional updated
key for node θ as
K
(SF)
t,θ := g
(αθ,2+rθ,2t)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3+[νθ,4,2d
∗
4+νθ,5,2d
∗
5+νθ,6,2d
∗
6 ]
2 . (2)
EncryptSF The algorithm picks z, χ4, χ5, χ6 randomly from Zq and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as
CT
(SF)
id,t :=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z ,C0 := g
z(d1+idd2+td3)+(χ4d4+χ5d5+χ6d6)
1
}
. (3)
We call a private key or key update semi-functional if all its parts are semi-functional, which are denoted as
SK
(SF)
id := {(θ,K
(SF)
id,θ )}θ∈Path(v)
KU
(SF)
t := {(θ,K
(SF)
t,θ )}θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,t).
We observe that a normal ciphertext CTid,t can be decrypted by a semi-functional key pair (K(SF)id,θ ,K
(SF)
t,θ ) on
some node θ, because d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in exponent of C0, and hence have no effect on
decryption. Similarly, decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext CT(SF)id,t by a normal key pair (Kid,θ,Kt,θ) on some
node θ will also succeed because d4,d5,d6 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in the exponent of the key. When
both the ciphertext and key pair on some node are semi-functional, the result of e(C(SF)0 ,K
(SF)
id,θ ) · e(C
(SF)
0 ,K
(SF)
t,θ )
will have an additional term, namely
e(g1, g2)
∑6
i=4(νθ,i,1+νθ,i,2)χid
∗
i ·di = e(g1, g2)
∑6
i=4(νθ,i,1+νθ,i,2)χiψ.
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Decryption will then fail unless
∑6
i=4(νθ,i,1 + νθ,i,2)χiψ ≡ 0 mod q. If this modular equation holds, we say
that the private key, key update and ciphertext pair is nominally semi-functional. In our security proof, there are
two types of nominally semi-functional pairs:
Nominally semi-functional pair of Type I
K
(SF)
id,θ := g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+[νθ,4,1 idd
∗
4−νθ,4,1d
∗
5 ]
2 ,
K
(SF)
t,θ := g
(αθ,2+rθ,2t)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3+[νθ,4,2td
∗
4−νθ,4,2d
∗
6 ]
2 ,
CT
(SF)
id,t :=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z ,C0 := g
z(d1+idd2+td3)+[χ4(d4+idd5+td6)]
1
}
,
where rθ,1, νθ,4,1, rθ,2, νθ,4,2, z, χ4 ←R Zq .
Nominally semi-functional pair of Type II
K
(SF)
id,θ := g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+[(αθ+νθ,4,1 id)d
∗
4−νθ,4,1d
∗
5 ]
2 ,
K
(SF)
t,θ := g
(αθ,2+rθ,2t)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3+[(−αθ+νθ,4,2t)d
∗
4−νθ,4,2d
∗
6 ]
2 ,
CT
(SF)
id,t :=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z ,C0 := g
z(d1+idd2+td3)+[χ4(d4+idd5+td6)]
1
}
,
where αθ, rθ,1, νθ,4,1, rθ,2, νθ,4,2, z, χ4 ←R Zq .
Note that nominally semi-functional pair of Type I is used to transform the non-challenge private key and key
update queries into semi-functional ones while Type II is for the challenge private key and key update queries.
Assume that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA makes at most qn1 private key queries id1, . . . , idqn1 and
qn2 key update queries t1, . . . , tqn2 . Since there are many types of adversaries according to whether the challenges
id∗(0), id
∗
(1) t
∗
(0), t
∗
(1) being queried and the restriction of queries, in order to simplify and unify reduction, we
add four dumb queries idqn1+1, idqn1+2, tqn2+1, tqn2+2 (the keys for these queries will not be given to A), which
makes the challenge identities id∗(0), id
∗
(1) and times t∗(0), t∗(1) be included in the qn1 + 2 private key queries and
the the qn2 + 2 key update queries. For any adversary, we use values ϕ1, ϕ2 (0 < ϕ1 < ϕ2 < qn1 + 2) to indicate
the positions of id∗(0), id
∗
(1) being queried, namely either the ϕ1-th or ϕ2-th query is id
∗
(0) and the other is id
∗
(1).
Similarly, we use values ϕ3, ϕ4 (0 < ϕ3 < ϕ4 < qn2 + 2) to indicate the positions of t∗(0), t∗(1) being queried.
Our proof of security consists of the following sequence of games between the adversary A and challengers.
• GameReal: is the real security game.
• GameReal′ : is a preliminary game, which is the same as GameReal except that the challenger picks φ1, φ2 ←R
[qn1 + 2] (0 < φ1 < φ2 < qn1 + 2) and φ3, φ4 ←R [qn2 + 2] (0 < φ3 < φ4 < qn2 + 2) before setup, and the
game is aborted if φi 6= ϕi for any i ∈ [4].
//Guess the positions of the challenge identities id∗(0), id
∗
(1) and times t∗(0), t∗(1). If the guess is incorrect then
the game aborts. Re-write
Γ1 := {id
′
1, . . . , id
′
qn1
} = {id1, . . . , idqn1+2}\{idϕ1 , idϕ2}
Γ2 := {t
′
1, . . . , t
′
qn2
} = {t1, . . . , tqn2+2}\{tϕ3, tϕ4}.
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• Game0: is the same as GameReal′ except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
• Gameκ1,κ2 : for κ1 from 1 to qn1 , for κ2 from 0 to ⌈logNmax⌉, Gameκ1,κ2 is the same as Game0 except that
the first κ1 − 1 private keys and the first κ2 components of the κ1-th private key for Γ1 are semi-functional
and the remaining keys are normal.
//Transform all private keys into semi-functional ones (one by one and node by node) except the φ1-th and
φ2-th private queries. Namely, the private keys for the challenge identities id∗(0), id∗(1) (if queried) are still
normal. Note that the number of nodes associated with a private key is ⌈logNmax⌉. Moreover Game1,0 and
Game0, Gameκ1,⌈logNmax⌉ and Gameκ1+1,0 are identical.
• Gameκ1,κ2 : for κ1 from qn1 +1 to qn2 , for κ2 from 0 to Nmax, Gameκ1,κ2 is the same as Gameqn1 ,⌈logNmax⌉
(namely all private keys for Γ1 are semi-functional) except that the first κ1− qn1 − 1 key updates and the first
κ2 components of the (κ1 − qn1)-th key update for Γ2 are semi-functional and the remaining key updates are
normal.
//Transform all key updates into semi-functional ones (one by one and node by node) except the φ3-th and φ4-th
key update queries. Namely, the key updates for the challenge times t∗(0), t∗(1) (if queried) are still normal. Note
that a key update for a time updates at most Nmax nodes. Moreover, Gameqn1 ,⌈logNmax⌉ and Gameqn1+1,0,
Gameκ1,Nmax and Gameκ1+1,0 are identical.
• Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2
: for κ2 from 0 to 4Nmax, Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2 is the same as Gameqn1+qn2 ,Nmax (namely
all private keys for Γ1 and key updates for Γ2 are semi-functional) except that the φ1, φ2-th private keys, the
φ3, φ4-th key updates for the first κ2 nodes are semi-functional and the remaining keys are normal.
//Transform the ϕ1, ϕ2-th private key and the ϕ3, ϕ4-th key update queries into semi-functional ones (node by
node). Note that there are at most 2⌈logNmax⌉ (≤ 4Nmax) nodes in the binary tree. Moreover,Gameqn1+qn2 ,Nmax
and Gameqn1+qn2+1,0 are identical, namely all keys are semi-functional in Gameqn1+qn2+1,4Nmax .
• GameFinal: is the same as Gameqn1+qn2+1,4Nmax , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional
encryption of a random message in GT and under a random identity in Zq a random time in Zq . We denote
the challenge ciphertext in GameFinal as CT(R)id(R),t(R) .
We prove the following lemmas to show the above games are indistinguishable. The advantage gap between
GameReal and Game0 is bounded by the advantage of the Subspace assumption in G1. Additionally, we require
a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext remains the
same from the adversary’s view. Similarly, the advantage gap between any two consecutive games of Game1,1
to Gameqn1+qn2+1,4Nmax is bounded by the advantage of Subspace assumption in G2. Finally, we statistically
transform Gameqn1+qn2+1,4Nmax to GameFinal in one step, i.e., we show the joint distributions of parameters in
these two games are equivalent from the adversary’s view.
We let AdvGameRealA denote an adversary A’s advantage in the real game.
Lemma 4. For any adversary A, AdvGameRealA (λ) ≤ (qn1qn2)2 · Adv
GameReal′
A (λ).
Proof: Since φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 are uniformly and independently generated, which are hidden from the adversary
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A’s view. The game is non-aborted with probability
4
(qn1 + 2)(qn1 + 1)(qn2 + 2)(qn2 + 1)
.
Thus,
Adv
GameReal
A (λ) =
(qn1 + 2)(qn1 + 1)(qn2 + 2)(qn2 + 1)
4
· Adv
GameReal′
A (λ)
≤ (qn1qn2)
2 · Adv
GameReal′
A (λ).
Lemma 5. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |AdvGameReal′A (λ)−Adv
Game0
A (λ)| = ǫ. Then there exists
an algorithm B0 such that AdvDS1B0 (λ) = ǫ+
2
q
, with K = 3 and N = 6.
Proof: B0 is given
D := (G; g
b
∗
1
2 , g
b
∗
2
2 , g
b
∗
3
2 , g
b1
1 , . . . , g
b6
1 , U1, U2, U3, µ2).
along with T1, T2, T3. We require that B0 decides whether T1, T2, T3 are distributed as gτ1b11 , g
τ1b2
1 , g
τ1b3
1 or
gτ1b1+τ2b41 , g
τ1b2+τ2b5
1 , g
τ1b3+τ2b6
1 .
B0 simulates GameReal′ or Game0 with A, depending on the distribution of T1, T2, T3. To compute the public
parameters and master key, B0 chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z3×3q (A is invertible with overwhelming
probability if it is uniformly picked) and implicitly sets dual orthonormal bases D,D∗ to:
d1 := b1, d2 := b2, d3 := b3, (d4,d5,d6) := (b4,b5,b6)A,
d
∗
1 := b
∗
1, d
∗
2 := b
∗
2, d
∗
3 := b
∗
3, (d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6) := (b
∗
4,b
∗
5,b
∗
6)(A
−1)⊤.
We note that D,D∗ are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Moreover, B0 cannot generate
g
d
∗
4
2 , g
d
∗
5
2 , g
d
∗
6
2 , but these will not be needed for creating normal private keys and key updates. B0 chooses random
value α ∈ Zq and computes gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
. It then gives A the public parameters
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 }.
The master key
MK := {α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2 }
is known to B0, which allows B0 to respond to all of A’s queries by calling the normal private keys, key updates,
and key revocation algorithms.
A sends B0 two pairs (id∗(0), t∗(0),m∗(0)) and (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)). B0 chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts
m∗(β) under (id
∗
(β), t
∗
(β)) as follows:
C := m∗(β) ·
(
e(T1, g
b
∗
1
2 )
)α
= m∗(β) · (g
α
T )
z, C0 := T1(T2)
id∗(β)(T3)
t∗(β) ,
where B0 has implicitly set z := τ1. It gives the ciphertext (C,C0) to A.
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Now, if T1, T2, T3 are equal to gτ1b11 , g
τ1b2
1 , g
τ1b3
1 , then this is a properly distributed normal encryption of m∗(β).
In this case, B0 has properly simulated GameReal′ . If T1, T2, T3 are equal to gτ1b1+τ2b41 , g
τ1b2+τ2b5
1 , g
τ1b3+τ2b6
1
instead, then the ciphertext element C0 has an additional term of
τ2b4 + id
∗
(β)τ2b5 + t
∗
(β)τ2b6
in its exponent. The coefficients here in the basis b4,b5,b6 form the vector (τ2, id∗(β)τ2, t∗(β)τ2). To compute
the coefficients in the basis d4,d5,d6, we multiply the matrix A−1 by the transpose of this vector, obtaining
τ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β))
⊤
. Since A is random (everything else given to A has been distributed independently of A),
these coefficients are uniformly random except with probability 2/q (namely, the cases τ2 defined in Subspace
problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equation 3 is the zero vector ) from Lemma 2. Therefore, in this case,
B0 has properly simulated Game0. This allows B0 to leverage A’s advantage ǫ between GameReal′ and Game0 to
achieve an advantage ǫ+ 2
q
against the Subspace assumption in G1, namely AdvDS1B0 (λ) = ǫ+
2
q
.
Lemma 6. For κ1 from 1 to qn1 , for κ2 from 0 to ⌈logNmax⌉, suppose that there exists an adversary A where
|Adv
Gameκ1,κ2−1
A (λ)−Adv
Gameκ1,κ2
A (λ)| = ǫ. Then there exists an algorithm Bκ1,κ2 such that Adv
DS2
Bκ1,κ2
(λ) = ǫ+ 6
q
,
with K = 3 and N = 6.
Proof: Bκ1,κ2 is given
D := (G; gb11 , g
b2
1 , g
b3
1 , g
b
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
6
2 , U1, U2, U3, µ2)
along with T1, T2, T3. We require that Bκ1,κ2 decides whether T1, T2, T3 are distributed as g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 or
g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 .
Bκ1,κ2 simulates Gameκ1,κ2 or Gameκ1,κ2−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T1, T2, T3. To compute the
public parameters and master key, Bκ1,κ2 chooses a random matrix A ∈ Z3×3q (with all but negligible probability,
A is invertible). We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D,D∗ to:
d1 := b1, d2 := b2, d3 := b3, (d4,d5,d6) := (b4,b5,b6)A,
d
∗
1 := b
∗
1, d
∗
2 := b
∗
2, d
∗
3 := b
∗
3, (d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6) := (b
∗
4,b
∗
5,b
∗
6)(A
−1)⊤.
We note that D,D∗ are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Bκ1,κ2 chooses random value
α ∈ Zq and compute gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
. B can gives A the public parameters
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 }.
The master key
MK := {α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2 }
is known to Bκ1,κ2 , which allows Bκ1,κ2 to respond to all of A’s private key and key update queries by calling the
normal key generation algorithm. Since Bκ1,κ2 also knows g
d
∗
4
2 , g
d
∗
5
2 , and g
d
∗
6
2 , it can easily produce semi-functional
keys. To answer the key queries that A makes, Bκ1,κ2 runs the semi-functional private key and key update generation
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algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ2-th component of the κ1-th private
key for id′κ1 , Bκ1,κ2 responds with:
Kid′κ1 ,θ
:= (g
b
∗
1
2 )
αθ,1T
id′κ1
1 (T2)
−1.
This implicitly sets rθ,1 := τ1. If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then this is a properly distributed normal
private key. Otherwise, if T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 , then this is a semi-functional
key, whose exponent vector includes
id′κ1τ2b
∗
4 − τ2b
∗
5 (4)
as its component in the span of b∗4,b∗5,b∗6. To respond to the remaining key queries, Bκ1,κ2 simply runs the normal
key generation algorithm.
At some point, A sends Bκ1,κ2 two pairs (id∗(0), t∗(0),m∗(0)) and (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)). B0 chooses a random bit
β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m∗(β) under (id
∗
(β), t
∗
(β)) as follows:
C := m∗(β) ·
(
e(U1, g
b
∗
1
2 )
)α
= m∗(β) · (g
α
T )
z , C0 := U1(U2)
id∗(β)(U3)
t∗(β) ,
where Bκ1,κ2 has implicitly set z := µ1. The “semi-functional part” of the exponent vector here is:
µ2b4 + id
∗
(β)µ2b5 + t
∗
(β)µ2b6. (5)
We observe that if id∗(β) = id
′
κ1
(which is impossible), then vectors 4 and 5 would be orthogonal, resulting in a
nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair (Bκ1,κ2 can also use T1, T2, T3 to generate private key part for
t∗(β)) of Type I. It gives the ciphertext (C,C0) to A.
We now argue that since id∗(β) 6= id
′
κ1
, in A’s view the vectors 4 and 5 are distributed as random vectors in the
spans of d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 and d4,d5,d6 respectively. To see this, we take the coefficients of vectors 4 and 5 in terms of
the bases b∗4,b∗5,b∗6 and b4,b5,b6 respectively and translate them into coefficients in terms of the bases d∗4,d∗5,d∗6
and d4,d5,d6. Using the change of basis matrix A, we obtain the new coefficients (in vector form) as:
τ2A
⊤(id′κ1 ,−1, 0)
⊤, µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β))
⊤.
Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ2-th component of the κ1-th private key Kid′κ1 ,θ and
the challenge ciphertext (C,C0) is independent of the random matrix A and id∗(β) 6= id
′
κ1
, we can conclude that
these coefficients are uniformly except with probability 4/q (namely, the cases µ2 or τ2 defined in Subspace problem
is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) or (νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1) defined in Equations 3 and 1 is the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus,
Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2 in this case.
If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then the coefficients of the vector 5 are uniformly except with
probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equations 3 is
the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2−1 in this case.
In summary, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated either Gameκ1,κ2−1 or Gameκ1,κ2 for A, depending on the distribution
of T1, T2, T3. It can therefore leverage A’s advantage ǫ between these games to obtain an advantage ǫ+ 6q against
the Subspace assumption in G2, namely AdvDS2Bκ (λ) = ǫ +
6
q
.
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Lemma 7. For κ1 from qn1 +1 to qn1+qn2 , for κ2 from 0 to Nmax, suppose that there exists an adversary A where
|Adv
Gameκ1,κ2−1
A (λ)−Adv
Gameκ1,κ2
A (λ)| = ǫ. Then there exists an algorithm Bκ1,κ2 such that Adv
DS2
Bκ1,κ2
(λ) = ǫ+ 6
q
,
with K = 3 and N = 6.
Proof: Bκ1,κ2 is given
D := (G; gb11 , g
b2
1 , g
b3
1 , g
b
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
6
2 , U1, U2, U3, µ2)
along with T1, T2, T3. We require that Bκ1,κ2 decides whether T1, T2, T3 are distributed as g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 or
g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 .
Bκ1,κ2 simulates Gameκ1,κ2 or Gameκ1,κ2−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T1, T2, T3. To compute the
public parameters and master key, Bκ1,κ2 chooses a random matrix A ∈ Z3×3q (with all but negligible probability,
A is invertible). We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D,D∗ to:
d1 := b1, d2 := b2, d3 := b3, (d4,d5,d6) := (b4,b5,b6)A,
d
∗
1 := b
∗
1, d
∗
2 := b
∗
2, d
∗
3 := b
∗
3, (d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6) := (b
∗
4,b
∗
5,b
∗
6)(A
−1)⊤.
We note that D,D∗ are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Bκ1,κ2 chooses random value
α ∈ Zq and compute gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
. B can gives A the public parameters
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 }.
The master key
MK := {α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2 }
is known to Bκ1,κ2 , which allows Bκ1,κ2 to respond to all of A’s private key and key update queries by calling the
normal key generation algorithm. Since Bκ1,κ2 also knows g
d
∗
4
2 , g
d
∗
5
2 , and g
d
∗
6
2 , it can easily produce semi-functional
keys. To answer the key queries that A makes, Bκ1,κ2 runs the semi-functional private key and key update generation
algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ2-th component of the κ1-th private
key for id′κ1 , Bκ1,κ2 responds with:
Kid′κ1 ,θ
:= (g
b
∗
1
2 )
αθ,1T
id′κ1
1 (T2)
−1.
This implicitly sets rθ,1 := τ1. If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then this is a properly distributed normal
private key. Otherwise, if T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 , then this is a semi-functional
key, whose exponent vector includes
id′κ1τ2b
∗
4 − τ2b
∗
5 (6)
as its component in the span of b∗4,b∗5,b∗6. To respond to the remaining key queries, Bκ1,κ2 simply runs the normal
key generation algorithm.
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At some point, A sends Bκ1,κ2 two pairs (id
∗
(0), t
∗
(0),m
∗
(0)) and (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)). B0 chooses a random bit
β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m∗(β) under (id
∗
(β), t
∗
(β)) as follows:
C := m∗(β) ·
(
e(U1, g
b
∗
1
2 )
)α
= m∗(β) · (g
α
T )
z , C0 := U1(U2)
id∗(β)(U3)
t∗(β) ,
where Bκ1,κ2 has implicitly set z := µ1. The “semi-functional part” of the exponent vector here is:
µ2b4 + id
∗
(β)µ2b5 + t
∗
(β)µ2b6. (7)
We observe that if id∗(β) = id
′
κ1
(which is impossible), then vectors 6 and 7 would be orthogonal, resulting in a
nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair (Bκ1,κ2 can also use T1, T2, T3 to generate private key part for
t∗(β)) of Type I. It gives the ciphertext (C,C0) to A.
We now argue that since id∗(β) 6= id
′
κ1
, in A’s view the vectors 6 and 7 are distributed as random vectors in the
spans of d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 and d4,d5,d6 respectively. To see this, we take the coefficients of vectors 6 and 7 in terms of
the bases b∗4,b∗5,b∗6 and b4,b5,b6 respectively and translate them into coefficients in terms of the bases d∗4,d∗5,d∗6
and d4,d5,d6. Using the change of basis matrix A, we obtain the new coefficients (in vector form) as:
τ2A
⊤(id′κ1 ,−1, 0)
⊤, µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β))
⊤.
Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ2-th component of the κ1-th private key Kid′κ1 ,θ and
the challenge ciphertext (C,C0) is independent of the random matrix A and id∗(β) 6= id
′
κ1
, we can conclude that
these coefficients are uniformly except with probability 4/q (namely, the cases µ2 or τ2 defined in Subspace problem
is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) or (νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1) defined in Equations 3 and 1 is the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus,
Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2 in this case.
If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then the coefficients of the vector 7 are uniformly except with
probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equations 3 is
the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2−1 in this case.
In summary, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated either Gameκ1,κ2−1 or Gameκ1,κ2 for A, depending on the distribution
of T1, T2, T3. It can therefore leverage A’s advantage ǫ between these games to obtain an advantage ǫ+ 6q against
the Subspace assumption in G2, namely AdvDS2Bκ (λ) = ǫ +
6
q
.
Bκ1,κ2 is given
D := (G; gb11 , g
b2
1 , g
b3
1 , g
b
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
6
2 , U1, U2, U3, µ2)
along with T1, T2, T3. We require that Bκ1,κ2 decides whether T1, T2, T3 are distributed as g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 or
g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 .
Bκ1,κ2 simulates Gameκ1,κ2 or Gameκ1,κ2−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T1, T2, T3. To compute the
public parameters and master key, Bκ1,κ2 chooses a random matrix A ∈ Z3×3q (with all but negligible probability,
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A is invertible). We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D,D∗ to:
d1 := b1, d2 := b2, d3 := b3, (d4,d5,d6) := (b4,b5,b6)A,
d
∗
1 := b
∗
1, d
∗
2 := b
∗
2, d
∗
3 := b
∗
3, (d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6) := (b
∗
4,b
∗
5,b
∗
6)(A
−1)⊤.
We note that D,D∗ are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Bκ1,κ2 chooses random value
α ∈ Zq and compute gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
. B can give A the public parameters
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 }.
The master key
MK := {α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2 }
is known to Bκ1,κ2 , which allows Bκ1,κ2 to respond to all of A’s private key and key update queries by calling the
normal key generation algorithm. Since Bκ1,κ2 also knows g
d
∗
4
2 , g
d
∗
5
2 , and g
d
∗
6
2 , it can easily produce semi-functional
keys. To answer the key queries that A makes, Bκ1,κ2 runs the semi-functional private key and key update generation
algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ2-th component of the (κ1−qn1)-th
key update for t′κ1−qn1 , Bκ1,κ2 responds with:
Kt′
κ1−qn1
,θ := (g
b
∗
1
2 )
αθ,2T
t′κ1−qn1
1 (T3)
−1.
This implicitly sets rθ,2 := τ1. If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then this is a properly distributed normal
key update. Otherwise, if T1, T2, T3 are equal to gτ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 , then this is a semi-functional
key update, whose exponent vector includes
t′κ1−qn1 τ2b
∗
4 − τ2b
∗
6 (8)
as its component in the span of b∗4,b∗5,b∗6. To respond to the remaining key queries, Bκ1,κ2 simply runs the normal
key generation algorithm.
At some point, A sends Bκ1,κ2 two pairs (id∗(0), t∗(0),m∗(0)) and (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)). B0 chooses a random bit
β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m(β) under (id∗(β), t∗(β)) as follows:
C := m∗(β) ·
(
e(U1, g
b
∗
1
2 )
)α
= m∗(β) · (g
α
T )
z , C0 := U1(U2)
id∗(β)(U3)
t∗(β) ,
where Bκ1,κ2 has implicitly set z := µ1. The “semi-functional part” of the exponent vector here is:
µ2b4 + id
∗
(β)µ2b5 + t
∗
(β)µ2b6. (9)
We observe that if t∗(β) = t′κ1−qn1 (which is impossible), then vectors 8 and 9 would be orthogonal, resulting in a
nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair (Bκ1,κ2 can also use T1, T2, T3 to generate private key part for
id∗(β)) of Type I. It gives the ciphertext (C,C0) to A.
We now argue that since t∗(β) 6= t′κ1−qn1 , in A’s view the vectors 8 and 9 are distributed as random vectors
in the spans of d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 and d4,d5,d6 respectively. To see this, we take the coefficients of vectors 8 and 9 in
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terms of the bases b∗4,b∗5,b∗6 and b4,b5,b6 respectively and translate them into coefficients in terms of the bases
d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6 and d4,d5,d6. Using the change of basis matrix A, we obtain the new coefficients (in vector form) as:
τ2A
⊤(t′κ1−qn1 ,−1, 0)
⊤, µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β))
⊤.
Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ2-th component of the (κ1 − qn1)-th key update
Kt′
κ1−qn1
,θ and the challenge ciphertext (C,C0) is independent of the random matrix A and t∗(β) 6= t′κ1−qn1 , we
can conclude that these coefficients are uniformly except with probability 4/q (namely, the cases µ2 or τ2 defined
in Subspace problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) or (νθ,4,2, νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2) defined in Equations 3 and 2 is the zero vector)
from Lemma 2. Thus, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2 in this case.
If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then the coefficients of the vector 9 are uniformly except with
probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equations 3 is
the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameκ1,κ2−1 in this case.
In summary, Bκ1,κ2 has properly simulated either Gameκ1,κ2−1 or Gameκ1,κ2 for A, depending on the distribution
of T1, T2, T3. It can therefore leverage A’s advantage ǫ between these games to obtain an advantage ǫ+ 6q against
the Subspace assumption in G2, namely AdvDS2Bκ (λ) = ǫ +
6
q
.
Lemma 8. For κ2 from 0 to 4Nmax, suppose that there exists an adversary A where |AdvGameqn1+qn2+1,κ2−1A (λ)−
Adv
Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2
A (λ)| = ǫ. Then there exists an algorithm Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 such that Adv
DS2
Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2
(λ) = ǫ+ 8
q
,
with K = 3 and N = 6.
Proof: Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 is given
D := (G; gb11 , g
b2
1 , g
b3
1 , g
b
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
b
∗
6
2 , U1, U2, U3, µ2)
along with T1, T2, T3. We require that Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 decides whether T1, T2, T3 are distributed as g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2
or g
τ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 .
Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 simulates Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2 or Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2−1 with A, depending on the distribution of
T1, T2, T3. To compute the public parameters and master key, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 chooses a random matrix A ∈ Z
3×3
q
(with all but negligible probability, A is invertible). We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D,D∗ to:
d1 := b1, d2 := b2, d3 := b3, (d4,d5,d6) := (b4,b5,b6)A,
d
∗
1 := b
∗
1, d
∗
2 := b
∗
2, d
∗
3 := b
∗
3, (d
∗
4,d
∗
5,d
∗
6) := (b
∗
4,b
∗
5,b
∗
6)(A
−1)⊤.
We note that D,D∗ are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 chooses random
value α ∈ Zq and compute gαT := e(g1, g2)αd1·d
∗
1
. B can gives A the public parameters
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 }.
The master key
MK := {α, g
d
∗
1
2 , g
d
∗
2
2 , g
d
∗
3
2 }
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is known to Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 , which allows Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 to respond to all of A’s private key and key update queries
by calling the normal key generation algorithm. Since Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 also knows g
d
∗
4
2 , g
d
∗
5
2 , and g
d
∗
6
2 , it can easily
produce semi-functional keys. To answer the key queries that A makes, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 runs the semi-functional
private key and key update generation algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A.
However, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 changes the strategy to respond all the components for the κ2-th node in the binary
tree of private keys and key updates. All key queries for Γ1 and Γ2 are similar with the following process except
that Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 uses g
d
∗
1
2 , . . . , g
d
∗
6
2 to re-randomize the exponents. To answer the component for the challenge
identities id∗(0), id∗(1) and times t∗(0), t∗(1) (namely, the φ1, φ2-th private key and φ3, φ4-th key update queries) on the
κ2-th node, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 picks α
′
θ,1, α
′′
θ,1 ∈ Zq and responds with:
Kid∗
(0)
,θ := g
α′θ,1b
∗
1
2 (T
b
∗
1
1 )
α′′θ,1T
r′θ,1id
∗
(0)
1 (T2)
−r′θ,1 ,
Kt∗
(0)
,θ := g
(α−α′θ,1)
2 (T
b
∗
1
1 )
−α′′θ,1T
r′θ,2t
∗
(0)
1 (T2)
−r′θ,2 ,
Kid∗
(1)
,θ := g
α′θ,1b
∗
1
2 (T
b
∗
1
1 )
α′′θ,1T
r′′θ,1id
∗
(1)
1 (T2)
−r′′θ,1 ,
Kt∗
(1)
,θ := g
(α−α′θ,1)
2 (T
b
∗
1
1 )
−α′′θ,1T
r′′θ,2t
∗
(1)
1 (T2)
−r′′θ,2 ,
where Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 implicitly sets αθ,1 := α
′
θ,1+α
′′
θ,1τ1 and αθ,2 := α−α′θ,1−α′′θ,1τ1 (note that αθ,1+αθ,2 = α).
Note that from the restriction of queries for the challenge identities and times, only part of the keys are given to
A.
If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then these are properly distributed normal keys. If T1, T2, T3 are
equal to gτ1b
∗
1+τ2b
∗
4
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2+τ2b
∗
5
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3+τ2b
∗
6
2 , then these are semi-functional keys, whose exponent vector includes
(α′′θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(0)τ2r
′
θ,1)b
∗
4 − τ2r
′
θ,1b
∗
5, (10)
(−α′′θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(0)τ2r
′
θ,2)b
∗
4 − τ2r
′
θ,2b
∗
6, (11)
(α′′θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(1)τ2r
′′
θ,1)b
∗
4 − τ2r
′′
θ,1b
∗
5, (12)
(−α′′θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(1)τ2r
′′
θ,2)b
∗
4 − τ2r
′′
θ,2b
∗
6, (13)
as its component in the span of b∗4,b∗5,b∗6 respectively. To respond to the remaining key queries, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2
simply runs the normal key generation algorithm.
At some point,A sends Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 two challenge pairs (id
∗
(0), t
∗
(0),m
∗
(0)) and (id
∗
(1), t
∗
(1),m
∗
(1)). Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2
chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m∗(β) under (id
∗
(β), t
∗
(β)) as follows:
C := m∗(β) ·
(
e(U1, g
b
∗
1
2 )
)α
= m∗(β) · (g
α
T )
z , C0 := U1(U2)
id∗(β)(U3)
t∗(β) ,
where Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 has implicitly set z := µ1. The “semi-functional part” of the exponent vector here is:
µ2b4 + id
∗
(β)µ2b5 + t
∗
(β)µ2b6. (14)
We observe that ((C,C0),Kid∗
(β)
,θ,Kt∗
(β)
,θ) would result in a nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair of
Type II. It gives the ciphertext (C,C0) to A.
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Since the adversary A is only allowed to query one of the following sets for the challenge identities and times:
∅, {id∗(0)}, {id
∗
(1)}, {t
∗
(0)}, {t
∗
(1)}, {id
∗
(0), id
∗
(1)}, {t
∗
(0), t
∗
(1)},
{id∗(0), t
∗
(1)}, {id
∗
(1), t
∗
(0)},
we now argue that in A’s view the given vectors 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are distributed as random vectors in the
spans of d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 and d4,d5,d6 respectively. To see this, we take the coefficients of vectors 10, 11, 12, 13 and
14 in terms of the bases b∗4,b∗5,b∗6 and b4,b5,b6 respectively and translate them into coefficients in terms of the
bases d∗4,d∗5,d∗6 and d4,d5,d6. Using the change of basis matrix A and statistical indistinguishability lemmas, we
obtain new random coefficients (in vector form), which are summarized in the following Table:
Case Type of Adversary New Coefficients
1 ∅ µ2A−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
2 {id∗(0)}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(0)τ2r
′
θ,1,−τ2r
′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
3 {id∗(1)}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(1)τ2r
′′
θ,1,−τ2r
′′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
4 {t∗
(0)
}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A
⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(0)
τ2r
′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′
θ,2)
⊤
5 {t∗
(1)
}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A
⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(1)
τ2r
′′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′′
θ,2)
⊤
6 {id∗(0), id
∗
(1)}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A
⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(0)τ2r
′
θ,1,−τ2r
′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
A⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(1)τ2r
′′
θ,1,−τ2r
′′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
7 {t∗
(0)
, t∗
(1)
}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A
⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(0)
τ2r
′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′
θ,2)
⊤
A
⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(1)
τ2r
′′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′′
θ,2)
⊤
8 {id∗(0), t
∗
(1)
}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A
⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(0)τ2r
′
θ,1,−τ2r
′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
A⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(1)
τ2r
′′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′′
θ,2)
⊤
9 {id∗(1), t
∗
(0)
}
µ2A
−1(1, id∗(β), t
∗
(β)
)⊤
A⊤(α′′
θ,1τ2 + id
∗
(1)τ2r
′′
θ,1,−τ2r
′′
θ,1, 0)
⊤
A
⊤(−α′′
θ,1τ2 + t
∗
(0)
τ2r
′
θ,2, 0,−τ2r
′
θ,2)
⊤
Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the coefficients of the vectors in above Table is independent
of the random matrix A, we can conclude that these coefficients are uniformly except with probability
• 2/q, namely except for the cases:
– µ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero,
– (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equation 3 the zero vector,
from Lemma 2 for Case 1.
• 4/q, namely except for the cases:
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– µ2 or τ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero,
– (χ4, χ5, χ6) or (νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1) or (νθ,4,2, νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2) defined in Equations 3, 1 and 2 is the zero
vector,
from Lemma 3 for Cases 2-5, since α′′θ,1 is randomly picked from Zq .
• 6/q, namely except for the cases:
– µ2 or τ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero,
– (χ4, χ5, χ6) or (νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1) or (νθ,4,2, νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2) defined in Equations 3, 1 and 2 is the zero
vector,
– (νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1) and (νθ,4,2, νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2) defined in Equations 1 and 2 are linearly dependent,
from Lemma 2 for Cases 6-9, since α′′θ,1 is randomly picked from Zq and the coefficients of vectors 10, 11, 12, 13
are linearly independent.
Thus, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2 in this case.
If T1, T2, T3 are equal to g
τ1b
∗
1
2 , g
τ1b
∗
2
2 , g
τ1b
∗
3
2 , then the coefficients of the vector 14 are uniformly except with
probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equations 3 is
the zero vector) from Lemma 2. Thus, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 has properly simulated Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2−1 in this case.
In summary, Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 has properly simulated either Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2−1 or Gameqn1+qn2+1,κ2 for A,
depending on the distribution of T1, T2, T3. It can therefore leverage A’s advantage ǫ between these games to
obtain an advantage ǫ+ 8
q
against the Subspace assumption in G2, namely AdvDS2Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2 (λ) = ǫ+
8
q
.
Lemma 9. For any adversary A, AdvGameqn1+qn2+1,4NmaxA (λ) ≤ Adv
GameFinal
A (λ) +
1
q
.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we show the joint distributions of
(PP,CT
(SF)
id∗
(β)
,t∗
(β)
, {SK
(SF)
idℓ
}ℓ∈[qn1 ], {KU
(SF)
tℓ
}ℓ∈[qn2 ])
in Gameν and that of
(PP,CT
(R)
id(R),t(R)
, {SK
(SF)
idℓ
}ℓ∈[qn1 ], {KU
(SF)
tℓ
}ℓ∈[qn2 ])
in GameFinal are equivalent for the adversary’s view, where CT(R)id(R),t(R) is a semi-functional encryption of a random
message in GT and under a random identity id(R) in Zq and a random time t(R) in Zq .
For this purpose, we pick A := (ξi,j) ←R Z3×3q and define new dual orthonormal bases F := (f1, . . . , f6), and
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F
∗ := (f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
6 ) as follows:

f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
f6


:=


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
ξ1,1 ξ1,2 ξ1,3 1 0 0
ξ2,1 ξ2,2 ξ2,3 0 1 0
ξ3,1 ξ3,2 ξ3,3 0 0 1




d1
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6


,


f
∗
1
f
∗
2
f
∗
3
f
∗
4
f
∗
5
f
∗
6


:=


1 0 0 −ξ1,1 −ξ2,1 −ξ3,1
0 1 0 −ξ1,2 −ξ2,2 −ξ3,2
0 0 1 −ξ1,3 −ξ2,3 −ξ3,3
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1




d
∗
1
d
∗
2
d
∗
3
d
∗
4
d
∗
5
d
∗
6


.
It is easy to verify that F and F∗ are also dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as D and D∗.
Then the public parameters, challenge ciphertext, queried private keys and key updates in Gameqn1+qn2+1,4Nmax
are expressed over bases D and D∗ as
PP := {G; gαT , g
d1
1 , g
d2
1 , g
d3
1 },
CT
(SF)
id∗
(β)
:=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z , C0 := g
z(d1+idd2+td3)+χ4d4+χ5d5+χ6d6
1
}
,
{
SK
(SF)
idℓ
:=
{(
θ,K
(SF)
idℓ,θ
:= g
(αθ,1+rθ,1idℓ)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+νθ,4,1d
∗
4+νθ,5,1d
∗
5+νθ,6,1d
∗
6
2
)}
θ∈Path(vℓ)
}
ℓ∈[qn1 ]
,
{
KU
(SF)
tℓ
:=
{(
θ,K
(SF)
tℓ,θ
:= g
(αθ,2+rθ,2tℓ)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3+νθ,4,2d
∗
4+νθ,5,2d
∗
5+νθ,6,2d
∗
6
2
)}
θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,tℓ)
}
ℓ∈[qn2 ]
.
Then we can express them over bases F and F∗ as
PP := {G; gαT , g
f1
1 , g
f2
1 , g
f3
1 },
CT
(SF)
id∗
(β)
:=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z , C0 := g
z′1f1+z
′
2f2+z
′
3f3+χ4f4+χ5f5+χ6f6
1
}
,
{
SK
(SF)
idℓ
:=
{(
θ,K
(SF)
idℓ,θ
:= g
(αθ,1+rθ,1idℓ)f
∗
1−rθ,1f
∗
2 +ν
′
θ,4,1f
∗
4 +ν
′
θ,5,1f
∗
5 +ν
′
θ,6,1f
∗
6
2
)}
θ∈Path(vℓ)
}
ℓ∈[qn1 ]
,
{
KU
(SF)
tℓ :=
{(
θ,K
(SF)
tℓ,θ
:= g
(αθ,2+rθ,2tℓ)f
∗
1−rθ,2f
∗
3 +ν
′
θ,4,2f
∗
4 +ν
′
θ,5,2f
∗
5 +ν
′
θ,6,2f
∗
6
2
)}
θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,tℓ)
}
ℓ∈[qn2 ]
.
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where
z′1 := z − χ4ξ1,1 − χ5ξ2,1 − χ6ξ3,1,
z′2 := zid
∗
(β) − χ4ξ1,2 − χ5ξ2,2 − χ6ξ3,2,
z′3 := zt
∗
(β) − χ4ξ1,3 − χ5ξ2,3 − χ6ξ3,3


ν′θ,4,1 := νθ,4,1 + ξ1,1(αθ,1 + rθ,1idℓ)− rθ,1ξ1,2,
ν′θ,5,1 := νθ,5,1 + ξ2,1(αθ,1 + rθ,1idℓ)− rθ,1ξ2,2,
ν′θ,6,1 := νθ,6,1 + ξ3,1(αθ,1 + rθ,1idℓ)− rθ,1ξ3,2


for θ ∈ Path(vℓ), ℓ ∈ [qn1 ],


ν′θ,4,2 := νθ,4,2 + ξ1,1(αθ,2 + rθ,2tℓ)− rθ,2ξ1,3,
ν′θ,5,2 := νθ,5,2 + ξ2,1(αθ,2 + rθ,2tℓ)− rθ,2ξ2,3,
ν′θ,6,2 := νθ,6,2 + ξ3,1(αθ,2 + rθ,2tℓ)− rθ,2ξ3,3


for θ ∈ KUNodes(BT,RL, tℓ), ℓ ∈ [qn2 ], which are all uniformly distributed if (χ4, χ5, χ6) defined in Equation 3
is a non-zero vector since
{ξij}i∈[3],j∈[3],
{
{νθ,4,1, νθ,5,1, νθ,6,1}θ∈Path(vℓ)
}
ℓ∈[qn1 ]
,
{{νθ,4,2νθ,5,2, νθ,6,2}θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,tℓ)}ℓ∈[qn2 ]
are all uniformly picked from Zq .
In other words, the coefficients (z, zid∗(β), zt∗(β)) of d1,d2,d3 in the C0 term of the challenge ciphertext is
changed to random coefficients (z′1, z′2, z′3) ∈ Zq×Zq×Zq of f1, f2, f3, thus the challenge ciphertext can be viewed
as a semi-functional encryption of a random message in GT and under a random identity in Zq and a random time
in Zq . Moreover, it is not difficult to check that all other coefficients are well distributed. Thus
(PP,CT
(SF)
id∗
(β)
,t∗
(β)
, {SK
(SF)
idℓ
}ℓ∈[qn1 ], {KU
(SF)
tℓ }ℓ∈[qn2 ])
expressed over bases F and F∗ is properly distributed as
(PP,CT
(R)
id(R),t(R)
, {SK
(SF)
idℓ
}ℓ∈[qn1 ], {KU
(SF)
tℓ }ℓ∈[qn2 ])
in GameFinal.
In the adversary’s view, both (D,D∗) and (F,F∗) are consistent with the same public key. Therefore, the challenge
ciphertext and queried secret keys above can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Gameν over
bases (D,D∗) and in GameFinal over bases (F,F∗). Thus, Gameqn1+qn1+1,4Nmax and GameFinal are statistically
indistinguishable.
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Lemma 10. For any adversary A, AdvGameFinalA (λ) = 0.
Proof: The value of β is independent from the adversary’s view in GameFinal. Hence, AdvGameFinalA (λ) = 0.
In GameFinal, the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in GT and under
a random identity in Zq and a random time in Zq , independent of the two messages, the challenge identities, and
times provided by A. Thus, our RIBE scheme is adaptively secure and anonymous.
V. CONSTRUCTION FROM DLIN
We use the same binary tree structure mentioned in previous section in our second construction.
A. Our Scheme
Here we provide our second construction of RIBE under the DLIN assumption. Our RIBE scheme is specified
as follows:
• Setup(λ,Nmax) On input a security parameter λ, a maximal number Nmax of users and generate a symmetric
bilinear pairing G := (q,G,GT , g, e) for sufficiently large prime order q. Next perform the following steps:
1) Let RL be an empty set and BT be a binary-tree with at least Nmax leaf nodes, set ST = BT.
2) Sample random dual orthonormal bases, (D,D∗) ←R Dual(Z9q). Let d1, . . . ,d9 denote the elements of
D and d∗1, . . . ,d∗9 denote the elements of D∗. It also picks α←R Zq and computes gαT := e(g, g)αd1·d
∗
1
.
3) Output RL, ST, the public parameters
PP :=
{
G; gαT , g
d1, . . . , gd6
}
,
and the master key MK
MK :=
{
α, gd
∗
1 , . . . , gd
∗
6
}
.
• PriKeyGen(PP,MK, id,RL, ST) On input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, an identity id, the
revocation list RL, and the state ST, it picks an unassigned leaf node v from BT and stores id in that node.
It then performs the following steps:
1) For any θ ∈ Path(v), if αθ,1, αθ,2, αθ,3 are undefined, then pick αθ,1, αθ,3 ←R Zq , set αθ,2 = α− αθ,1,
and store them in node θ. Pick rθ,1, rθ,3 ←R Zq and compute
Kid,θ := g
(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+(αθ,3+rθ,3id)d
∗
4−rθ,3d
∗
5 .
2) Output SKid := {(θ,Kid,θ)}θ∈Path(v), ST.
• KeyUpd(PP,MK, t,RL, ST) On input the public parameters PP, the master key MK, a time t, the revocation
list RL, and the state ST, it performs the following steps:
1) ∀θ ∈ KUNodes(BT,RL, t), if αθ,1, αθ,2, αθ,3 are undefined, then pick αθ,1, αθ,3 ←R Zq , set αθ,2 =
α− αθ,1, and store them in node θ. Pick rθ,2, rθ,4 ←R Zq and compute
Kt,θ := g
(αθ,2+rθ,2t)d
∗
1−rθ,2d
∗
3+(−αθ,3+rθ,4t)d
∗
4−rθ,4d
∗
6 .
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2) Output KUt := {(t, θ,Kt,θ)}θ∈KUNodes(BT,RL,t).
• DecKeyGen(SKid,KUt) On input a private secret key SKid := {(i,Kid,i)}i∈I, KUt := {(j,Kt,j)}j∈J for some
set of nodes I, J, it runs the following steps:
1) ∀(i,Kid,i) ∈ SKid, (j,Kt,j) ∈ KUt, if ∃(i, j) s.t. i = j then DKid,t ← (Kid,i,Kt,j); else (if SKid and KUt
do not have any node in common) DKid,t ← ⊥.
2) Output DKid,t.
• Enc(PP, id, t,m) On input the public parameters PP, an identity id, a time t ∈ Znq , and a message m, it picks
z1, z2 ←R Zq and forms the ciphertext as
CTid,t :=
{
C := m · (gαT )
z1 ,C0 := g
z1(d1+idd2+td3)+z2(d4+idd5+td6)
}
.
• Dec(PP,DKid,t,CTid,t) On input the public parameters PP, a decryption key DKid,t := (Kid,θ,Kt,θ), and a
ciphertext CTid,t := (C,C0), it computes the message as
m := C/ (e(C0,Kid,θ) · e(C0,Kt,θ)) .
• KeyRev(id, t,RL, ST) On input an identity id, a time t, the revocation list RL, and the state ST, the algorithm
adds (id, t) to RL for all nodes ν associated with identity id and returns RL.
Correctness. Observe that
e(C0,Kid,θ)
= e(gz1(d1+idd2+td3)+z2(d4+idd5+td6), g(αθ,1+rθ,1id)d
∗
1−rθ,1d
∗
2+(αθ,3+rθ,3id)d
∗
4−rθ,3d
∗
5 )
= e(g, g)αθ,1z1d1·d
∗
1+αθ,3z2d4·d
∗
4 .
Similarly, e(C0,Kt,θ) = e(g, g)αθ,2z1d1·d
∗
1−αθ,3z2d4·d
∗
4
. Then
e(C1,Kid,θ) · e(C1,Kt,θ)
= e(g, g)αθ,1z1d1·d
∗
1+αθ,3z2d4·d
∗
4 · e(g, g)αθ,2z1d1·d
∗
1−αθ,3z2d4·d
∗
4
= g
(αθ,1+αθ,2)z1
T
= (gαT )
z1 .
B. Proof of Security
We show the RIBE scheme is secure by the following theorem, the proof techniques are essentially the same as
those for Theorem 1 except that we use the DLIN-based Subspace assumption of [16].
Theorem 2. The RIBE scheme is adaptively secure and anonymous under the DLIN assumption. More precisely,
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for any adversary A against the RIBE scheme, there exist probabilistic algorithms
B0,
{Bκ1,κ2}κ1=1,...,qn1 ,κ2=1,...,⌈logNmax⌉,
{Bκ1,κ2}κ1=qn1+1,...,qn1+qn2+1,κ2=1,...,Nmax ,
{Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2}κ2=1,...,4Nmax
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that
Adv
RIBE
A (λ) ≤ (qn1qn2)
2 ·
(
Adv
DLIN
B0 (λ) +
qn1∑
κ1=1
⌈logNmax⌉∑
κ2=1
Adv
DLIN
Bκ1,κ2
(λ) +
qn2∑
κ1=qn1+1
Nmax∑
κ2=1
Adv
DLIN
Bκ1,κ2
(λ)
+
4Nmax∑
κ2=1
Adv
DLIN
Bqn1+qn2+1,κ2
(λ) +
6(qn1⌈logNmax⌉+ qn2Nmax) + 32Nmax + 6
q
)
where qn1 , qn2 ≥ 4 are the maximum number of A’s private key and key update queries respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented two efficient RIBE schemes under the SXDH and the DLIN assumptions, respectively,
which overcome the existing problem of increasing sizes of public parameters. In comparison with the existing
schemes of [5, 21], our RIBE schemes are adaptively secure, anonymous and have constant-size public parameters,
although they have larger sizes of keys and ciphertexts. Our RIBE schemes can be extended very naturally to
obtain revocable IPE schemes with weakly attribute-hiding [24, 26]. Also our techniques can be applied to a more
generally setting, for example, the ABE schemes of [26] to obtain adaptively secure revocable ABE schemes.
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